Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University

Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law
Eric J. Schmertz Selected Reports, Awards and
Opinions, 1967-2006 Special Collection

Eric J. Schmertz Special Collections

1983

Reports, Awards, and Opinions 1983-2
Eric J. Schmertz

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/schmertz_ROA
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Schmertz, Eric J., "Reports, Awards, and Opinions 1983-2" (1983). Eric J. Schmertz Selected Reports,
Awards and Opinions, 1967-2006 Special Collection. 60.
https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/schmertz_ROA/60

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Eric J. Schmertz Special Collections at Scholarly
Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Eric J. Schmertz Selected Reports, Awards and
Opinions, 1967-2006 Special Collection by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For
more information, please contact lawlas@hofstra.edu.

J
In the Matter o£ the Arbitration
between
American Federation of Government
Employees, Local 1119

OPINION
and
AWARD

and
Franklin Delano Roosevelt
Veterans Administration Hospital

The stipulated issue is:
Was the removal of Dr. Siraporn Bharksuwan
Chimapan in violation of the contract? If
so what shall be the remedy?
Hearings were held at the Hospital offices on October 20
and November 22, 1982 at which time Dr. Chimapan, hereinafter
referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above
named Union and Hospital appeared.

All concerned were afforded

full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived

and the Union and the Hospital filed post-hearing briefs.
When terminated, the grievant was a probationary employee.
The termination of probationary employees is controlled by Article
34 Section 1 of the contract.

That Section reads:

SECTION 1. A probationary or trial employee
may be separated from the service without
undue formality. The decision to terminate
will not be made capriciously. Probationary
employees are entitled to a full and fair
evaluation, however, it is recognized that
incidents involving hazards to patients,
property, or employees may require prompt
action.
As the parties recognize, and as the foregoing section
provides, the instant issue is not whether the grievant's terrain-
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ation was for "just cause," but rather whether the Hospital's
action was arbitrary or capricious.

That means that the grievant'

termination must be affirmed unless found to be discriminatorily
based or devoid of reason or rationality.

Whether the reasons

for the dismissal meet the higher standard of "just cause" is
immaterial in this case.
Based on the record before me, I cannot conclude that the
Hospital's decision to terminate the grievant was arbitrary or
capricious or violative of Article 34 Section 1.
The Hospital has shown to my satisfaction that the grievant'
work performance as a dietary employee was marred by dietary
errors; that she failed to meet certain instructional duties; and
that she was absent more than a reasonable amount of time.

While

the specifics of these facts may not rise completely to the level
of "just cause" ( and for a permanent employee would warrant
warnings and/or a suspension) they are sufficient to rebut a
claim of arbitrariness or capriciousness.
The grievant's defenses do not overturn this conclusion.
That the grievant might not have received as much training as
possible or was not familiarized with all the locations she was
to work in, do not excuse her several mistakes probatively
established in the hearings, in giving certain patients wrong
diets or proscribed utensils.

The grievant holds a PHd degree

in nutrition, food and education.
basic dietary errors.

She should not have made these

The Union claims that the diet cards are

suspect because they were not made readily available to the Union
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during the processing of the grievance and because certain notations thereon are not in the grievant's handwriting.

I am

satisfied that the critical parts of the diet cards are bonafide;
that the grievant should have understood them; and that there is
no evidence, including the grievant's testimony about the cards,
which would support a conclusion that the failure to produce
them earlier had anything to do with their authenticity.
The same is true with regard to the Union's claim that the
grievant was not sufficiently trained or familiarized with her
work areas.

Those claims notwithstanding, an employee of the

grievant's prior experience and education should not have made
those mistakes and therefore I see no causal connection between
her numerous dietary errors and her failure to attend and teach
certain instructional courses for other employees, and any alleged
lack of training or orientation.
The Union claims that the grievant was not given a "full
and fair evaluation" within the meaning of Article 34 Section 1.
It asserts that the first part of her probationary period, when
her work was apparently satisfactory under a different supervisor,
was not considered in her total evaluation leading to her dismissal and that that earlier supervisor did not testify. The
Union misinterprets the import and purpose of the probationary
period.

Apparently it is saying that if a portion of the pro-

bationary period is satisfactory, a probationary employee may not
be terminated.

It is well settled that the reverse is true.

For
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a probationary employee to achieve regular or permanent status,
the full probationary period, as a totality, must be judged
satisfactory.

Clearly, if poor work or conduct during a signifi-

cant portion of the probationary period could be nullified or
excused simply because at other times during the probationary
period the employee worked satisfactorily, the universally
recognized purposes of the probationary period would be subverted
to the detriment of management's legitimate right to terminate
those who fail to meet requisite standards during the "trial" or
probationary phase of their employment.

Had the Union wanted the

testimony of the grievant's first supervisor, the Union could have
called her as a Union witness.
The Union contends that the grievant did not receive
sufficient formal evaluations

that would have put her on notice

of the Hospital's concern about her work.

I do not read Article

34 Section 1 to require formal or even written evaluations.
is noted that

It

a probationary employee "may be separated from the

service without undue formality."
evaluations unnecessary.

To my mind that makes formal

The evidence shows that the grievant

did receive written ratings on an evaluation form and was spoken
to often and repeatedly about her work and the mistakes she was
making.

Those talks constituted, in my view, counseling (which

the Union also claims she did not receive) and also served to
give notice to the grievant that her work was not satisfactory.
As such the contractual "full and fair evaluation" requirement,
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within the express contractual leeway of not being unduly formal
was met.
The Union also claims that the supervisor who recommended
the grievant's termination was ethnically prejudiced against
her.

At best the evidence on this claim is unclear and

ambiguous. Though the supervisor questioned about or remarked
on the grievant's United States citizenship (the grievant is a
native of Thailand)

the testimony in the record on that

matter is insufficient to prove prejudice, bias or a capricious
recommendation of dismissal.
For the foregoing reasons, together with the total record
before me, I conclude that the grievant's termination was
contractually proper.
With the foregoing ruling, I again urge and recommend
to the Hospital that it consider accepting and implementing the
proposal for settlement of this dispute which I made during the
hearings.

That mediated, proposed settlement was not implemente

by the Hospital I understand, because the vacancy into which
the grievant could be placed did not materialize.

By now that

vacancy or another comparable vacancy may have become available.
I think, if given another chance, the grievant would be able to
perform her duties satisfactorily.

However, at this point,

acceptance of this recommendation and its implementation is
solely within the discretion of the Hospital.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
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having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The removal of Dr. Siraporn Bharksuwan
Chimapan was not in violation of the
contract.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: January 4, 1983
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York ) " "
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
American Federation of Government
Employees, Local 1119

OPINION
and
AWARD

and
Franklin Delano Roosevelt
Veterans Administration Hospital

The stipulated issue is:
Was the removal of Dr. Siraporn Bharksuwan
Chimapan in violation of the contract? If
so what shall be the remedy?
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may be separated from the service without
undue formality. The decision to terminate
will not be made capriciously. Probationary
employees are entitled to a full and fair
evaluation, however, it is recognized that
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As the parties recognize, and as the foregoing section
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That means that the grievant1

termination must be affirmed unless found to be discriminatorily
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Based on the record before me, I cannot conclude that the
Hospital's decision to terminate the grievant was arbitrary or
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of "just cause" ( and for a permanent employee would warrant
! warnings and/or a suspension) they are sufficient to rebut a

j

claim of arbitrariness or capriciousness.
The grievant's defenses do not overturn this conclusion.
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which would support a conclusion that the failure to produce
them earlier had anything to do with their authenticity.
The same is true with regard to the Union's claim that the
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Apparently it is saying that if a portion of the pro-
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a probationary employee to achieve regular or permanent status,
the full probationary period, as a totality, must be judged
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Clearly, if poor work or conduct during a signifi-

cant portion of the probationary period could be nullified or
excused simply because at other times during the probationary
period the employee worked satisfactorily, the universally
recognized purposes of the probationary period would be subverted
to the detriment of management's legitimate right to terminate
those who fail to meet requisite standards during the "trial" or
probationary phase of their employment.

Had the Union wanted the

testimony of the grievant's first supervisor, the Union could have
called her as a Union witness.
The Union contends that the grievant did not receive
sufficient formal evaluations that would have put her on notice
of the Hospital's concern about her work.

I do not read Article

34 Section 1 to require formal or even written evaluations.
is noted that

It

a probationary employee "may be separated from the

service without undue formality."
evaluations unnecessary.

To my mind that makes formal

The evidence shows that the grievant

did receive written ratings on an evaluation form and was spoken
to often and repeatedly about her work and the mistakes she was
making.

Those talks constituted, in my view, counseling (which

the Union also claims she did not receive) and also served to
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within the express contractual leeway of not being unduly formal1,
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The Union also claims that the supervisor who recommended
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For the foregoing reasons, together with the total record
before me, I conclude that the grievant's termination was
contractually proper.
With the foregoing ruling, I again urge and recommend
to the Hospital that it consider accepting and implementing the
proposal for settlement of this dispute which I made during the
hearings.

That mediated, proposed settlement was not implemented

by the Hospital I understand, because the vacancy into which
the grievant could be placed did not materialize.

i

By now that

vacancy or another comparable vacancy may have become available.
I think, if given another chance, the grievant would be able to
perform her duties satisfactorily.

However, at this point,

acceptance of this recommendation and its implementation is
solely within the discretion of the Hospital.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
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having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The removal of Dr. Siraporn Bharksuwan
Chimapan was not in violation cf the
contract.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: January 4, 1983
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

American Arbitration Association
VOLUNTARY LABOR ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL
In the Matter of the Arbitration between

0
CASE NUMBER:

/J?3 &

/<£ fl 7

J~

AWARD OF ARBITRATOR

T
J.H
. HE

UNDERSIGNED ARBITRATOR^X), having been designated in
accordance with the arbitration agreement entered into by the above-named Parties, and dated
and having been duly sworn and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, AWARDS as follows:

Arbitrator's signature (dated)

STATE OF
COUNTY OF
On this

ss

day of

, 1 9 , before m e personally

came and appeared
to me known and known to me to be the individual (s) described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

FORM L14-AAA

American Arbitration Association
VOLUNTARY LABOR ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL
In the Matter of the Arbitration between

CASE NUMBER:

AWARD OF ARBITRATOR

T
AHHE

UNDERSIGNED ARBITRATOR(S), having been designated in
accordance with the arbitration agreement entered into by the above-named Parties, and dated
and having been duly sworn and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, AWARDS as follows:

T^v/^

Arbitrator's signature (dated)

STATE OF
COUNTY OF
On this

day of

,19

, before me personally

came and appeared
to me known and known to me to be the individual (s) described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

FORM L14-AAA

American Arbitration Association
VOLUNTARY LABOR ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL
In the Matter of the Arbitration between

CASE NUMBER:

AWARD OF ARBITRATOR

T
J.H
.HE

UNDERSIGNED ARBITRATOR(S), having been designated in
arbitration agreement entered into by the above-named Parties, and dated
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heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, AWARDS as follows :

accordance with the

'IM^^^^

s&m>i*j*

Arbitrator's signature (dated)

STATE OF
COUNTY OF
On this
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day of

,19

, before me personally

came and appeared
to me known and known to me to be the individual (s ) described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

FORM L14-AAA

American Arbitration Association
VOLUNTARY LABOR ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL
In the Matter of the Arbitration between

CASE NUMBER:

AWARD OF ARBITRATOR

T
AH
HE

UNDERSIGNED ARBITRATOR(S), having been designated in
agreement entered into by the above-named Parties, and dated
and having been duly sworn and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, AWARDS as follows:

accordance with the

arbitration

Arbitrator's signature (dated)

STATE OF
COUNTY OF
On this

ss

day of

,19

, before me personally

came and appeared
to me known and known to me to be the individual(s) described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

FORM L14-AAA

American Arbitration Association
VOLUNTARY LABOR ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL
In the Matter of the Arbitration between

CASE NUMBER:

AWARD OF ARBITRATOR

T
AH
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UNDERSIGNED ARBITRATOR(S), having been designated in
arbitration agreement entered into by the above-named Parties, and dated
and having been duly sworn and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties. AWARDS as follows:

accordance with the

a a^^^l

Arbitrator's signature (dated)

STATE OF
COUNTY OF
On this

day of

,19

, before me personally

came and appeared
to me known and known to me to be the individual(s) described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

FORM L14-AAA

American Arbitration Association
VOLUNTARY LABOR ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL
In the Matter of the Arbitration between

CASE NUMBER:

AWARD OF ARBITRATOR

T
AH
HE

UNDERSIGNED ARBITRATOR(S), having been designated in
arbitration agreement entered into by the above-named Parties, and dated
and having been duly sworn and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, AWARDS as follows:

accordance with the

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF
I,
, do hereby affirm upon my oath as Arbitrator that
I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my award.

(Dated)

roRMu,Nvs,,B2

(Signature of Arbitrator)

FOR USE IN NEW YORK STATE

American Arbitration Association
VOLUNTARY LABOR ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL
Tn the Matter of the Arbitration between

CASE NUMBER:

AWARD OF ARBITRATOR

T
AHE

UNDERSIGNED ARBITRATOR(S), having been designated in
accordance with the arbitration agreement entered into by the above-named Parties, and dated
and having been duly sworn and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, AWARDS as follows:

^~^/^/^/^4w/ p

_.„

U#* ^^ & &0?!&f*£f»yZ ^T
STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF
I, ^/T/C \ j - J? ^*/f-/*? Cv€ ( 2, do hereby affirm upon my oath as Arbitrator that
I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my award.
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(Dated)

F O R MU 4 N VS, / 8 2

(Signature of Arbitrator)

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
IUE, Radio & Machinery Workers, AFL-CIO
Local 301AE, Schenectady, New York

OPINION AND AWARD
Case No. 1530 0453 82
N.D. No. 73,058

and
General Electric Company
Schenectady, New York

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate Article XI, Section
6 of the 1979-1982 GE-IUE National Agreement
when Warren Clark was not re-employed on his
former job in December 1981? If so, what shall
be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Schenectady, New York on December 17,
1982 at which time Mr. Clark, hereinafter referred to as the
grievant, and representatives of the above named Union and Company
appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

A stenographic record was

taken and the parties filed post-hearing briefs.
Article XI, Section 6 of the contract reads:
An employee with continuity of service out
due to illness for a period not exceeding
one year who returns to work shall be reemployed on his former job providing he is
able to perform the job and normal seniority
provisions permit.
The grievant worked as an Off-Hull Operator.
radiation is a regular condition of that job.

Exposure to

For three and one-

half months from August 30, 1981 the grievant was ill.

He suffered

-2from a type of skin cancer in the form of a lesion located on a
vocal cord.

The lesion was removed; he underwent treatment; and

on December 18, 1981 he applied to be reinstated to the Off-Hull
Operator's job.
The single issue is whether, under the circumstances of that
illness, he was "able to perform the job" within the meaning of
Article XI Section 6 of the contract.

He had "continuity of

service;" he was "out due to illness for a period not exceeding
one year;" and his "seniority" was adequate.
The Company refused to permit the grievant to return to
the Off-Hull Operator's job.

It determined that with his cancer

history, he would be more susceptible to a recurrence of cancer
if he resumed a job which exposed him to radiation.

The Company's

decision was based upon the opinion of its Medical Director,
supported by documentary medical information from the United
States Navy on whose contracts the Off-Hull Operator worked.
It is the Company's position that its medical judgment and
its determination that the grievant was not able to perform the
job because of his medical history, were reasonable, prudent and
fair, and should not be overturned unless arbitrary, capricious
or discriminatory.

The Union asserts, based primarily on the

testimony of the grievant's physician, that the lesion was success
fully removed; that the grievant was cured of the cancer; and that
in any event he was "able to perform the job" within the meaning
and intent of Article XI Section 6 of the contract.
On the questions of "ability, skill and qualifications,"
this arbitrator is a member of the school of arbitrators who

-3believe that an employer's judgment on those factors should enjoy a presumption of validity and correctness, and should not be
overturned unless found by the arbitrator to be arbitrary,
capricious or discriminatory.

However, that well settled pre-

sumption is founded on the sensible theory that, prima facie,
at least, the employer knows more about an employee's job skills,
experience, conduct and other factors directly related to his
ability to perform the work in question.

That presumption re-

lates to the traditional characteristics of job performance,
namely physical (i.e. manual) skills, education and intellectual
capacity to perform the duties, relevant job-related experience,
and prior job performance.

I am not persuaded that that presump-

tion obtains to such an esoteric and debatable subject as the
effect on an employee who has suffered from vocal cord cancer if
again exposed to radiation, and whether his susceptibility is
greater than anyone else who has not had a history or incident of
cancer.

Whereas the Company certainly has a priority of credible

information about how well or how poorly an employee may be able
to perform a particular set of duties, I am not persuaded that it
medical opinions in the instant narrow and controversial setting
enjoy any such priority or presumption of correctness.
The fact is, as this case disclosed, that the medical
authorities are split on whether there is a greater susceptibility
to a recurrence of cancer under the instant particular circumstances.

The grievant's physician, who has specialized in this

discipline, testified not only that the removal of the lesion was
completely successful, but that there was no greater chance of a

-4recurrence of the problem if the grievant was re-exposed to
radiation than otherwise, and that he was fully capable of returning to the Off-Hull Operator job and fully able to perform
the required duties.

The Company's medical testimony and evidenc

was to the contrary.
I find the medical evidence to be conflicting,
and hence inconclusive one way or the other.

off-setting,

In the absence of

any presumption in favor of the Company's medical opinion, I am
constrained to hold that the provisions of Article XI Section 6
must obtain.

That contract provision is clear.

It requires the

Company to return an employee to his firmer job following return
from illness, provided the employee is able to perform that job.
There is no medical evidence in the record which persuasively
shows that the grievant was not able to perform the Off-Hull
Operator duties.

Indeed I think that "able to perform" language

is and was intended to apply in a customary and traditional sense
naemly whether an employee has the manual, intellectual and
sensory ability to perform the duties together with the requisite
education and experience.

I do not think it was negotiated to

apply to the kind of medical condition involved in this case,
especially when that medical condition does not have a direct
bearing on the grievant's ability to carry out the regular and
routine job functions of the Off-Hull Operator, and where any
relationship between his prior vocal cord cancer and its possible
recurrence due to a new exposure to radiation, is as medically
speculative as this record indicates.
The Company's reliance on the management rights clause is
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not persuasive.

That clause is "subject.... to any limitations

stated in this Agreement."

Clearly Article XI Section 6 is such

a specific limitation.
The Company's reliance on Article III is not applicable.
In my opinion that Article relates to the work environment (by
referring to safety inspections, safety devices, guards, and
medical services).

It was not intended, in my view, to cover

the removal of an employee from a job to which he would otherwise
be entitled under Article XI Section 6, because of a speculative
determination that the existing work environment, which itself
is not violative of Article III, might be unhealthy to him.
In short, under the particular circumstances of this case,
I conclude that the burden was on the Company to show convincingly that the grievant's return to the Off-Hull Operator job with
its attendant radiation exposure would trigger or contribute to
a recurrence of the cancer condition.
that burden.

The Company has not met

This is not to say that the Company did not act

responsibly and fairly.

Indeed, I am persuaded that it acted in

what it considered to be the grievant's best interest.

It ex-

tended his benefits and provided him with a different non-radiation job (albeit one which paid less that what he earned as an
Off-Hull Operator.)

Nonetheless, despite its good intentions,

I must conclude that the Company failed to comply with the
express requirements of Article XI Section 6 of the contract.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
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The Company violated Article XI Section 6
of the 1979-1982 GE-IUE National Agreement
when Warren Clark was not re-employed on
his former job in December, 1981. If Mr.
Clark wishes, the Company shall return him
to his former job, and he shall be made
whole for the difference in pay between what
he has earned since his return from sick
leave and what he would have earned had he
been restored to the Off-Hull Operator job
on December 18, 1981, calculated on the basis
of his prior average incentive earnings.

DATED: April 8, 1983
STATE OF New York )ss<
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Union of Electrical
Radio and Machine Workers Local 773

OPINION
and
AWARD

and
N. D. #75357
General Electric Company
Cincinnati, Ohio

Case #52 30 0024

83

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Charles Pugh? If not what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held in Cincinnati, Ohio on February 16, 1983
at which time Mr. Pugh, hereinafter referred to as the grievant
and representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The

Post-hearing briefs were filed.

The grievant is charged with purposefully hiding himself
in the stock room to sleep and being asleep during his regular
working hours.

The Company asserts that as a short service em-

ployee with "no mitigating factors" in his record, its decision
to discharge him for the offense was not unreasonable and should
be upheld.
I am persuaded that the grievant did deliberately put himself in a hidden location; intended to "rest" and probably intended to sleep; and that his falling asleep during working hours was
a direct result of his conscious decision to put himself in that
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hidden location.

As such, I must conclude that being asleep -

and I find he was sleeping - was more a result of willfulness
than negligence.
However, I disagree with the Company about mitigating
factors.

I accept the grievant's claim that he was under medica-

tion for a shoulder injury and that that medication caused dr®wsi
ness.

I do not excuse him from his act of falling asleep in the

remote and hidden location of the stock room.

He should have

dealt with his drowsiness another way, with notice to and the
permission of supervision.

But if, as I think reasonable, he

felt sleepy and fell asleep, in part at least, because of his
injury and the medication he was taking for it, I do not consider
his misconduct to be quite as serious as if he had fallen asleep
without any such reason or without any such medical explanation.
Also, the grievant is not such a short term employee as to
be denied the traditional benefit of progressive discipline.

He

had been employed for over three years and though there were some
disciplinary "contact reports" and warnings in his file (which
were stale by operation of the contract terms and practices),
he was never previously suspended for any disciplinary offense.
Under the two foregoing mitigating circumstances, particula
to this case, I do not think that the grievant's misconduct rose
to the level of just cause for dismissal.

The Company's Code of

Conduct on this type of offense - which permits discipline "up
to and including discharge" should have been implemented with an
allowable lesser penalty.
The grievant should have been suspended.
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The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of Charles Pugh is reduced
to a suspension. He shall be reinstated
but without back pay.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: April 21, 1983
STATE OF New York ) SSe .
COUNTY OF New York ) ''
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
IUE Radio and Machine Workers, Local 191
OPINION AND AWARD
Case #30 30 0031 82

and
General Electric Company

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate Article V, Section
8 of the 1979-1982 GE-IUE National Agreement when Kelly D. Owens was not scheduled
to work on Saturday, January 24, 1981? If
so, what shall the remedy be?
A hearing was held in Atlanta, Georgia on March 4, 1983 at
which time Mr. Owens, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant"
and representatives of the above named Union and Company appearec
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The

A stenographic record was taken

and both sides filed post-hearing briefs.
I am persuaded that this matter came to arbitration because
the Union believed, based on the records it saw, or as reported
to it, that the grievant had less assigned overtime than employee
David Billingsley, and that therefore, under Article V Section 8
of the contract, the overtime work on Saturday, January 24, 1981
should have been assigned to the former rather than to the latter
Article V Section 8 reads:
Division of Overtime
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Overtime shall be divided as equally as
proficient operations permit among the employees who are performing similar work in
the group. A record of overtime worked by
employees (or credited to them) will be
maintained by the Foreman for his group and
will be available for examination by the
appropriate Union Steward upon request.
At the hearing, the overtime statistics and quantity worked
by the grievant and Billingsley were disputed by the parties,
and the evidence presented was inconclusive.

At the request of

the Arbitrator, the parties, subsequent to the hearing, examined
the official overtime records, and submitted to the Arbitrator a
jointly signed statement (received as Joint Exhibit 4 in the
record) agreeing on the respective quantities of overtime which
had been worked by the grievant and Billingsley at the time of
the January 24, 1981 disputed assignment.

That Exhibit agrees

on and shows statistics contrary to the Union's position at the
hearing.
It officially shows that the grievant had worked 28.5 hours
of overtime and Billingsley had worked 10 hours of overtime.
With that official and now undisputed information,

it is

obvious that the assignment of the Saturday, January 24, 1981
overtime to Billingsley was consistent with the requirement of
Article V Section 8 that "overtime shall be divided as equally
as proficient operations permit..."
It is undisputed that the two employees involved had been
performing "similar work" in their regular assignments.

Though

the grievant had considerably more experience than Billingsley

-3and was a more efficient worker the record does not show that
the matter of "proficiency" is not a managerial decision or that
the assignment to Billingsley was not "operationally proficient"
within the meaning of the contract.
Under the forgoing circumstances I need not reach or decide
whether the grievant and Billingsley were in the same "group."
Accordingly, the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate Article V Section
8 of the 1979-1982 GE-IUE National Agreement
when Kelly D. Owens was not scheduled to work
on Saturday, January 24, 1981.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: May 31, 1983
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

.

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Greater New York Health Care
Facilities Association, on behalf
of Petitions for Members

INTERIM AWARD

,*

and

Local 144, S.E.I.U.

Pending the final determination of the "30 per cent
cases" presently before me and without prejudice to the
positions of the parties in those arbitrations or to the final
outcome thereof, the Union shall not seek to collect that portion of the indebtedness of the Homes and facilities involved
in those cases which represents the said "30 per cent
giveness" plus the interest thereon0

for-

However, in accordance

with regular accounting procedures, the parties are directed
to identify the amounts of said 30 per cent plus

the interest

thereon for each Home and facility involved in the Association's
petition0

'Erfc/r
Arbitrator
DATED: September 28, 1982
STATE OF New York )ss.:
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Greater New York Health Care
Facilities Association, on behalf
of Petitions for Members

INTERIM AWARD

and
Local 144, S.E.I.U.

My interim Award of September 28, 198JJ-which temporarily
enjoined the Union from collecting "that portion of the indebtedness of the Homes and facilities...which represents the....
'30% forgiveness1 plus the interest thereon" and which directed
the parties "in accordance with regular accounting procedures
to identify the amounts of said 30 per cent plus the interest
thereon," is hereby revoked.
The Union may resume collection of the amounts represented
by said "30% forgiveness" plus interest thereon from the Homes
and facilities together with any and all other amounts due and
owing, and the Homes and facilities are directed to make said
payments.
As before, I retain jurisdiction over the "30% forgiveness
cases" for final determinations

thereof.

Eric JyScKmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: July 6, 1983
STATE OF New York )
ss . :
COUNTY OF New York )

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
GAIU Local 274

OPINION AND AWARD
File No. 83K25287

and
Hamilton Reproductions, Inc.

The stipulated issues are:
(1) Is the grievance arbitrable?
(2) Was the lay-off of John Rounds in
violation of Articles 10 and 46 of
the contract? If so what shall be
the remedy?
(3) Was the discharge of John Rounds for
just cause? If not what shall be the
remedy ?
A hearing was held on November 2, 1983 at which time Mr.
Rounds, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared.

All con-

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbi-

trator's Oath was waived; a stenographic record was taken; and
the parties filed post-hearing briefs.
In the course of the hearing I ruled that if the grievance
is arbitrable, the grievant's discharge for an alleged poor work
record was not for just cause.

My ruling is based on the well

settled rule that a poor work record is not grounds for summary
dismissal, but requires imposition of progessive discipline in
the form of a warning and a suspension before discharge is proper
In the instant case the grievant was neither warned nor suspended
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before being

terminated.

The Company asserts that the grievance is not arbitrable
because the discharge was accepted or acquiesced in by responsible Union representatives at the time it occurred and by the
passage of four months before the grievance was filed.

It is

the Company's testimony that the reaction of the Union representa
tive to the grievant's discharge was that "he wasn't surprised"
and that "it would not be grieved."
The Company argues that a delay of four months, when other
contemporary

grievances were dealt with and settled much earlier,

is evidence of the Union's acceptance of the discharge; a waiver
of its right to grieve; and beyond a reasonable time after the
dispute arose.
I find the grievance arbitrable.
time limit on the filing of grievances.

The contract places no
This is not to say that

any length of time can elapse before a grievance is filed or
arbitration sought or that the rule of "reasonable time" is not
applicable, but rather that I am not persuaded that four months
is an excessive period of delay or beyond the point of reasonableness.

That other grievances contemporary with the grievant's

discharge were dealt with without any consideration of the
grievant's case does not constitute a waiver or abandonment of
the latter.

Indeed, where the contract is silent on a time limit

for filing a grievance; where the inclusion of a time limit was
within the contemplation of the parties when the contract was
negotiated, but where no such limit was legislated, and where

-3there has been no explicit settlement or clear abandonment of the
grievance within the four months period, I am unable to conclude
that the contract or the circumstances bar the grievance from
arbitration on the merits.

This does not mean that in consider-

ing the grievance on the merits, the arbitrator may not consider
the delay in raising the grievance in fashioning a remedy if the
grievance is sustained.

I will deal with that phase of the matter

presently.
Nor can I construe the statement of the Union representative
as a waiver of the grievant's right to grieve; an acquiescence in
the Company's action or a "constructive" settlement of the issue.
The Union's representatives "lack of surprise" or doubt that the
discharge would be grieved, does not rise to the level of an
explicit^unequivocal and enforceable agreement between the parties
to go not further with the issue.
An employee's right to protest the capital penalty of discharge, or even a layoff for that matter cannot be waived or
abandoned by such personal views of the union representative without more evidence of a bi-lateral and unambiguous understanding.
If the Company relied on what was said, and believed that there
would be no grievance, I cannot find that it had either a probativ
factual or contractual basis for doing so.
Accordingly, with the issue arbitrable, and with my ruling
that the discharge was improper, it follows that the grievant is
entitled to reinstatement.

The question that remains is from or

at what point is he entitled to reinstatement? Is it from the

-4date of his discharge (while he was on layoff status), or, if
his layoff was improper, from the point of the layoff, or at
some other point?
I conclude that the grievant's reinstatement shall be at
a point that makes unnecessary a determination on the propriety
of his layoff.

The four month delay in filing the grievance,

though not fatal to the arbitrability of the grievance has not
been adequately explained or justified to impose on the Company
for
the running liability/that period of time, especially in view of
the possibly misleading, albeit personal statements of the Union
representative.

Also, there is evidence that the grievant could

have mitigated the damages by accepting the Company's offer of
other employment while the basic dispute was grieved and arbitrated
In view of those circumstances the fair and reasonable point of
reinstatement in my view is as of the date that the grievance was
filed, namely on May 13, 1983.
makes a determination

Reinstatement as of that date

of the propriety of the earlier layoff

unnecessary.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The grievance of John Rounds is arbitrable.
The discharge of John Rounds was not for
just cause. He shall be reinstated with
back pay and otherwise made whole effective as of May 13, 1983, less earningffrom
any employment from the period May 13 to
the date of reinstatement.

-5The propriety of his earlier layoff is
mooted by the foregoing.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: January 10, 1984
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York )'"
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

A

r

Hercules Incorporated
Hercules Plaza
Wilmington, DE 19899
(302) 594-5000

October 26,

1983

Mr. Eric J. Schmertz
Hofstra University School of Law
Hempstead, NY 11550
Dear Mr. Schmertz:
Under the circumstances of tnis case, the Company will
withdraw its request for executive session as scheduled for
October 26, 1983 at 3:00 p.m. In reviewing the draft opinion
as circulated, the Company Arbitrator does believe that it was
necessary to consider the practice of the parties in order to
fully evaluate the specific contract language in question.
However, at the same time, it is clear that the Chairman believed
the contract language to be clear and unambiguous and therefore
it was unnecessary to consider the issue of past practice.
In the unlikely event that the Union Arbitrator requests
executive session, the Company Arbitrator will make every effort
to attend the session as scheduled. Otherwise, the Company will
consider the executive session to have been cancelled.
If the executive session is indeed cancelled, I assume you
will now circulate the award to the Company and Union Arbitrators
for signature.
Thank you for your patience in scheduling the
aforementioned session.
Very truly yours,

I. L. Holt
Regional Employe Relations Manager
ILH:dac
2736E
cc:

Mr. William J. Pohmer
93A Shaker Road
Albany, New York 19899

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
be-ween
United Steelworkers of America,
Local 13226

AWARD
Case No. 1330 1176 81

and
Kerculesv, Incorporated

I
The Undersignedj duly designated as the Board of
;

Arbitration in the above matter and having duly heard the

!

proofs and allegations of the above named parties make the
following AWALD:
Trie Company violated the contract by its
aceions during the week of June 29, 1981.
Those employees of tne Commercial Departmer.:« who were "scheduled off" but who would
not have been laid off or furloughed under
Section VI of the contract and who did not
receive vacation pay for the days in question, sha^l be made whole for their loss of
rs.r for June 29 30 Tvilv 1 ^~d 2. 193",

--•

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

1
William J. Pohmer
Concurring

I. Lee Holt
Dissenting
; |

TN * '111 1 -

i|

—'4.V. J-4LJ*^ .

ji

STATE OF Ne Yor;: )
COUNTY OF Nev. Yor.-c )

i!

/•»

;

'-•_*--•

i^C-^J O...U^C J.

C

.

•"

-.7 O--

.
""

I, E^: - J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
ij Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.,
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DATED:
IO - ~
STATE OF ^Vflw ^^ )
COUNTY OF QlAr^v
)'
I, William J. Pohmer do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

|j

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

)
)

.

t
I, I. Lee Holt do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
United Steelworkers of America,
Local 13226

OPINION AND AWARD
Case No. 1330 1176 81

and
j|

Hercules, Incorporated

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the contract by
its action during the week of June 29,
1981? If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing on the merits of this case was held on January
21, 1983 at which time representatives of the above named Union
and Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The case was heard by a tri-partite board consisting of the undersigned as Chairman and Messrs. William J. Pohmer and I. Lee Holt
as the Union and Company designated arbitrators respectively.
The Arbitrators' Oath was waived.

The parties filed post-hearing

lj briefs.
On the days of June 29, 30, July 1 aid 2, 1981, the

.
I Company shut down the Commercial Department because of a diminutiojn
I'
• in available work, and "scheduled off" or removed from the active
h

payroll for those days approximately 60 employees of that
II
Department.'
The Company does not claim that the scheduling off of those
employes?'1 ,££ thce-: four d«*/u ;-.»» i layoff ur xurlougu .wicnin tne

-2meaning of the contract.

Rather, the Company asserts that it

took this action because of a short term unavailability of work
and that its action was in accordance with its managerial rights
and consistent with past practice.

Under that circumstance, the

Company argues, it was not required to effectuate a layoff or a
furlough wit^:. attendant seniority considerations.

It is un-

disputed that while these 60 employees were not working, junior
employees in certain other departments remained at work.
The Union claims that the "scheduling off" was in fact a

I
layoff; that it did not follow the layoff and seniority provisions
of the contract; and that the affected employees should be made
whole for the four days loss of wages.

The Union does acknowledgfe

that those affected employees who requested and received vacation
pay for those days would not be entitled to damages.
It is a fundamental rule of labor law that when an
employer and a union have bargained meaningfully on a subject,
the product of that bargain as reflected in the contract defines
the rights of the parties on that subject for the balance of the j
term of the collective bargaining agreement.

In that circumstanc

the union is barred from further bargaining during the contract
term on that and other aspects of that subject.

Similarly, where

the subject is meaningfully and comprehensively dealt with in
the contract, the employer is estopped from claiming that he has
reserved managerial rights over that subjec' different from the
explicit contract provisions.
In the instant case the parties obviously bargained extensively and meaningfully over the status and job security of

-3of employees in the case of a diminution of available work.
Section VI and its subdivisions thereof set forth in detail the
layoff and furlough procedures in the event of "production cutbacks" and "when it becomes necessary to reduce the work force."
I am satisfied that these comprehensive conditions and procedures
/

. •

represent the mutually Agreed 'jpcn and exclusive methods to
reduce the work force,because of a diminution of available work. !
It is unnecessary in this case to distinguish between or
to define the differences between a layoff and a furlough.
Suffice it to say that each is contractually responsive to and
deals with reductions in available work and the attendant excess
of employees.

Having provided, these contractual actions when a

sufficient amount of work is not available, I conclude that those
are the only proper methods available to the Company to deal with
that circumstance, and that the Company did not reserve any
managerial, implied cr reserved right to take different steps to i
reduce the work force, either temporarily ox for longer periods,
in the face of less business.

It should be noted that the manage-

ment rights clause of the contract is "subject to the express
provisions of this Agreement."

I deem the layoff and furlough

provisions of. the contract to be "express provisions" which limit
the Company's managerial rights.
Specifically, in the instant case, having bargained on the
subject and having agreed to the methods of layoff and furlough
the Company retained no right to remove the grievants from the
tttviivfc bajpr^xi. for- ta« rjtr.r as. . involved when, as the Company
concedes, its action was neith i a furlough nor a layoff.

Had

-4the Company wanted a procedure to deal with short-term work
reductions, and had it thought the use of layoffs or furloughs
to be applicable only to a longer or permanent reduction in the
work force, it should have sought and obtained that delineation
as part of the contract.

As the contract presently reads there

is no distinction betwean a fnort-term, longer term or permanent
«

•

.1

reduction in business, and hence there is no contractual circumstance limiting layoffs or furloughs only to the latter situation^
At present those two procedures are contractually applicable to
any production cutback or reduction in the work force.
The Company relies on past practice.

It asserts that it

has "scheduled off" employees in departments without regard to
seniority in past situations comparable to the instant case.
evidence on this is mixed.

The

It appears that in some instances the

Union agreed to the arrangement.

In others the employees did not

grieve or the use o5 vacation time for the days involved was an
arrangement acceptable to the Union and the affected employees.
In others, the entire plant was shut-down.
of past practice is immaterial.

In any event the issufe

It is well settled that past

practice is applicable only where the contract language is
ambiguous.

But where the contract language is clear, either

party has the right to require strict adherence to the contract
terms irrespective of any earlier practices.

Here, assuming

arguendo that there has been a practice supportive of what the
Company did in the instant case, I deem the explicit provisions
i

of che contract otailn^ w_th iayofrs and furloughs to be the
clear and unambiguous contract arrangement dealing with any

-5reductions in the work force, and the Union has the right to
insist, as it does in this case, on adherence to those provisions!,
regardless of any past practice to the contrary.
Accordingly I find that the Company violated the contract
by its actions during the week of June 29, 1981.

The reduction

of the work force in the Commercial Department should have been
undertaken pursuant to .the relevant provisions of Section VI of
the contract.

By not doing so the Company violated the contract

by "scheduling off" those Union officials occupying the Union
offices referred to in paragraph (j) of Section VI of the contract, and it violated the contract by "scheduling off" those
employees in the Commercial Department who by virtue of their
iI

jj

greater seniority would not have been laid off or furloughed had
the layoff or furlough provisions of the contract been followed.
As a remedy those employees in the Commercial Department
who were scheduled off, but who would not h; ye been laid off or
f ;.r 1 jugheid f^^er £eci_icti, Vx '-r -ne concracc and wno did not receive
vacation pay for the days in question, shall be made whole for
I

I

the four days off.

Eric J. Schmertz
DATED: September 9, 1983
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York ) " "

Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
United Steelworkers of America,
Local 13226

AWARD
Case No. 1330 1176 81

and
Hercules, Incorporated

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Board of
Arbitration in the above matter and having duly heard the
proofs and allegations of the above named parties make the
following AWARD:
The Company violated the contract by its
actions during the week of June 29, 1981.
Those employees of the Commercial Department who were "scheduled off" but who would
not have been laid off or furloughed under
Section VI of the contract and who did not
receive vacation pay for the days in question, shall be made whole for their loss of
pay for June 29, 30, July 1 and 2, 1981.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

William. J.Pohmer
Concurring

I. Lee Holt
Dissenting
DATED: September 9, 1983
STATE OF New York )ss.
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

-2-

DATED:
STATE OF 7Uv * 1 J ^
COUNTY OF oi^vf

)
)

I, William J. Pohmer do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED :
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

)s s *
) '" "

I, I. Lee Holt do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument which is my AWARD.

-2-

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

ss

I, William J. Pohmer do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED :
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

ss

I, I. Lee Holt do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
United Steelworkers of America,
Local 13226

OPINION AND AWARD
Case No. 1330 1176 81

and
Hercules, Incorporated

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the contract by
its action during the week of June 29,
1981? If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing on the merits of this case was held on January
21, 1983 at which time representatives of the above named Union
and Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The case was heard by a tri-partite board consisting of the undersigned as Chairman and Messrs. William J. Pohmer and I. Lee Holt
as the Union and Company designated arbitrators respectively.
The Arbitrators' Oath was waived.

The parties filed post-hearing

briefs.
On the days of June 29, 30, July 1 and 2, 1981, the
Company shut down the Commercial Department because of a diminution
in available work, and "scheduled off" or removed from the active
payroll for those days approximately 60 employees of that
Department.
The Company does not claim that the scheduling off of those
employees on those four days was a layoff or furlough within the

-2-

meaning of the contract.

Rather, the Company asserts that it

took this action because of a short term unavailability of work
and that its action was in accordance with its managerial rights
and consistent with past practice.

Under that circumstance, the

Company argues, it was not required to effectuate a layoff or a
furlough with attendant seniority considerations.

It is un-

disputed that while these 60 employees were not working, junior
employees in certain other departments remained at work.
The Union claims that the "scheduling off" was in fact a
layoff; that it did not follow the layoff and seniority provisions
of the contract; and that the affected employees should be made
whole for the four days loss of wages.

The Union does acknowledge

that those affected employees who requested and received vacation
pay for those days would not be entitled to damages.
It is a fundamental rule of labor law that when an
employer and a union have bargained meaningfully on a subject,
the product of that bargain as reflected in the contract defines
the rights of the parties on that subject for the balance of the
term of the collective bargaining agreement.

In that circumstanc

the union is barred from further bargaining during the contract
term on that and other aspects of that subject.

Similarly, where

the subject is meaningfully and comprehensively dealt with in
the contract, the employer is estopped from claiming that he has
reserved managerial rights over that subject different from the
explicit contract provisions.
In the instant case the parties obviously bargained extensively and meaningfully over the status and job security of

-3-

of employees in the case of a diminution of available work.
Section VI and its subdivisions thereof set forth in detail the
layoff and furlough procedures in the event of "production cutbacks" and "when it becomes necessary to reduce the work force."
I am satisfied that these comprehensive conditions and procedures
represent the mutually agreed upon and exclusive methods to
reduce the work force because of a diminution of available work.
It is unnecessary in this case to distinguish between or
to define the differences between a layoff and a furlough.
Suffice it to say that each is contractually responsive to and
deals with reductions in available work and the attendant excess
of employees.

Having provided these contractual actions when a

sufficient amount of work is not available, I conclude that those
are the only proper methods available to the Company to deal with
that circumstance, and that the Company did not reserve any
managerial, implied or reserved right to take different steps to
reduce the work force, either temporarily or for longer periods,
in the face of less business.

It should be noted that the manage

ment rights clause of the contract is "subject to the express
provisions of this Agreement."

I deem the layoff and furlough

provisions of the contract to be "express provisions" which limit
the Company's managerial rights.
Specifically, in the instant case, having bargained on the
subject and having agreed to the methods of layoff and furlough
the Company retained no right to remove the grievants from the
active payroll for the four days involved when, as the Company
concedes, its action was neither a furlough nor a layoff.

Had

-4the Company wanted a procedure to deal with short-term work
reductions, and had it thought the use of layoffs or furloughs
to be applicable only to a longer or permanent reduction in the
work force, it should have sought and obtained that delineation
as part of the contract.

As the contract presently reads there

is no distinction between a short-term, longer term or permanent
reduction in business, and hence there is no contractual circumstance limiting layoffs or furloughs only to the latter situations
At present those two procedures are contractually applicable to
any production cutback or reduction in the work force.
The Company relies on past practice.

It asserts that it

has "scheduled off" employees in departments without regard to
seniority in past situations comparable to the instant case.
evidence on this is mixed.

The

It appears that in some instances the

Union agreed to the arrangement.

In others the employees did not

grieve or the use of vacation time for the days involved was an
arrangement acceptable to the Union and the affected employees.
In others, the entire plant was shut-down.
of past practice is immaterial.

In any event the issu

It is well settled that past

practice is applicable only where the contract language is
ambiguous.

But where the contract language is clear, either

party has the right to require strict adherence to the contract
terms irrespective of any earlier practices.

Here, assuming

arguendo that there has been a practice supportive of what the
Company did in the instant case, I deem the explicit provisions
of the contract dealing with layoffs and furloughs to be the
clear and unambiguous contract arrangement dealing with any
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reductions in the work force, and the Union has the right to
insist, as it does in this case, on adherence to those provisions
regardless of any past practice to the contrary.
Accordingly I find that the Company violated the contract
by its actions during the week of June 29, 1981.

The reduction

of the work force in the Commercial Department should have been
undertaken pursuant to the relevant provisions of Section VI of
the contract.

By not doing so the Company violated the contract

by "scheduling off" those Union officials occupying the Union
offices referred to in paragraph (j) of Section VI of the contract, and it violated the contract by "scheduling off" those
employees in the Commercial Department who by virtue of their
greater seniority would not have been laid off or furloughed had
the layoff or furlough provisions of the contract been followed.
As a remedy those employees in the Commercial Department
who were scheduled off, but who would not have been laid off or
furloughed under Section VI of the contract and who did not receive
vacation pay for the days in question, shall be made whole for
the four days off.

DATED: September 9, 1983
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) "

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
District 15, International
Association of Machinists

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #82K/22674

and
Hoke, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Is the grievance arbitrable?
If so, is the grievant Kenneth Pausz entitled to ten percent above his regular
night shift rate pursuant to Article XXIII
Section 4 of the contract? If so what shall
be the remedy, including the effective date?
A hearing was held in Clifton, New Jersey on December 15,
1982 at which time Mr. Pausz, hereinafter referred to as the
grievant and representatives of the above named Union and Company
appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The Union and the Company filed

post-hearing briefs.
The Company's contention that the grievance was not arbitrable is upheld.
Article XI Section 3 of the collective bargaining agreement
reads :
Grievances on errois in monetary computations must be filed within six (6) months
of their occurrence. Grievances of any
other nature must be filed within (30)
days of the date of their occurrence.
The instant grievance was not filed either within thirty
days or six months from its occurrence.

The grievant became a

-2permanent lead man on the night shift in the Maintenance Department on October 13, 1978.

At that point there was nothing latent

or undisclosed either about his status as a permanent lead man
or about his potential eligibility for an additional amount up
to ten percent above his night shift rate.

Article XXIII Section

4 of the contract which refers to the "additional amount up to
ten percent... to a permanent lead person working on the night
shift" was then, as now, an explicit provision of the contract.
Clearly, based on the Union's present contractual theory of this
case, the grievant and the Union knew or should have known on or
shortly thereafter October 13, 1978 that the grievant might be
eligible for the additional payment referred to in Article XXIII
Section 4. That the Company did not pay the grievant additional
money up to ten per cent above his regular night shift rate at
that time was the "occurrence" of the grievance within the meaning of Article XI Section 3 of the contract.

From that point,

namely on or about October 13, 1978, a grievance should have been
filed within six months if the Union viewed the Company's failure
or refusal to pay the additional money as an "error in monetary
computation" or within thirty days if the Union viewed the
failure or refusal of the Company as any other contract breach.
The grievance was not filed until February 8, 1982, more than
three years after the grievant became a lead man on the night
shift.
Attention is called to the mandatory language of Article
XI Section 3.

It states that grievances "must be filed" within

either six months or thirty days of their occurrence, whichever
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is applicable.

It is well settled that such mandatory language

constitutes a contractual statute of limitations.
There is no evidence in this case that the Company waived
those time limits in connection with this claim.

Nor is there

any evidence that by past practice the parties have disregarded
those contractual time limits.

The Arbitrator is therefore bound

to the contract language which the parties themselves negotiated.
I do not agree with the Union that this is a "continuing
grievance" which revives itself or begins again at any or all
times subsequent to October 13, 1978 so long as the additional
payment called for by Article XXIII Section 4 is not paid.

It

is not a "continuing grievance" because the Company acted once.
It placed the grievant on the night shift as a permanent lead
man and did not pay him ten percent above his regular night shift
rate.

Thereafter it made no further decisions and took no further

action in that regard.

In my view a "continuing grievance" re-

quires a reiteration and renewal of the original decision or the
implementation of a new decision having the same or similar advers
effect.

A continuation of an event rooted in a single managerial

determination

(here the Company's decision not to pay the addi-

tional ten percent because there was already "an employee" on
the night shift receiving the additional ten percent, thereby,
in the Company's opinion, satisfying the requirements of Article
XXIII Section 4), is not a continuing grievance.

Rather it is a

perpetuation of and synonymous with the original "occurrence."
The instant situation is no more a "continuing grievance"
than a discharge, where an employer takes a single action terminating an employee, and that employee remains off the payroll

-4through a series of pay periods until his grievance is heard.
Clearly, a time limit on filing that grievance is binding from
the date of discharge and may not be filed after a contractual
time limit has expired merely because the affected employee is
"continuously" off the payroll.

Similarly here, the contractual

time limits relate to and run from the Company's single action
in not paying the grievant the additional ten percent when he
was placed on the night shift as a permanent lead man, and not
from any time or period thereafter.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The grievance of Kenneth Pausz is not
arbitrable.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: March 8, 1983
STATE OF New York ) ss>:
COUNTY OF New York ) "
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE,

ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
j District 15, International
! Association of Machinists

I

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #82K/22674

and
Hoke, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Is the grievance arbitrable?

I
If so, is the grievant Kenneth Pausz entitled to ten percent above his regular
night shift rate pursuant to Article XXIII
Section 4 of the contract? If so what shall
be the remedy, including the effective date?

|
!
i

A hearing was held in Clifton, New Jersey on December 15,
;! 1982 at which time Mr. Pausz, hereinafter referred to as the
i! grievant and representatives of the above named Union and Company
jj

'

' i

;

ij appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

;(

;j evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
:j

'! The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The Union and the Company filed

post-hearing briefs.
The Company's contention that the grievance was not arbitrable is upheld.
Article XI Section 3 of the collective bargaining agreement

i

reads:
Grievances on errois in monetary computations must be filed within six (6) months
of their occurrence. Grievances of any
other nature must be filed within (30)
days of the date of their occurrence.
The instant grievance was not filed either within thirty
days or six months from its occurrence.

The grievant became a
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II

permanent lead man on the night shift in the Maintenance DepartI

ment on October 13, 1978.

At that point there was nothing latent
:

or undisclosed either about his status as a permanent lead man

i
i
or about his potential eligibility for an additional amount up
to ten percent above his night shift rate.

Article XXIII Section

4 of the contract which refers to the "additional amount up to
ten percent... to a permanent lead person working on the night

j
j

shift" was then, as now, an explicit provision of the contract.
Clearly, based on the Union's present contractual theory of this i
I
case, the grievant and the Union knew or should have known on or !
i

shortly thereafter October 13, 1978 that the grievant might be

i
|

eligible for the additional payment referred to in Article XXIII
Section 4. That the Company did not pay the grievant additional

;

money up to ten per cent above his regular night shift rate at
that time was the "occurrence" of the grievance within the mean- •
'\g of Article XI Section 3 of the contract.

From that point,

jj namely on or about October 13, 1978, a grievance should have been
I
filed within six months if the Union viewed the Company's failure
or refusal to pay the additional money as an "error in monetary
computation" or within thirty days if the Union viewed the

I

failure or refusal of the Company as any other contract breach.
i

! The grievance was not filed until February 8, 1982, more than
!
three years after the grievant became a lead man on the night
j
| shift.
i

Attention is called to the mandatory language of Article
XI Section 3.

It states that grievances "must be filed" within

either six months or thirty days of their occurrence, whichever

-3is applicable.

It is well settled that such mandatory language

constitutes a contractual statute of limitations.
There is no evidence in this case that the Company waived
those time limits in connection with this claim.

Nor is there

any evidence that by past practice the parties have disregarded
those contractual time limits.

The Arbitrator is therefore bound

to the contract language which the parties themselves negotiated.
I do not agree with the Union that this is a "continuing
grievance" which revives itself or begins again at any or all
times subsequent to October 13, 1978 so long as the additional
payment called for by Article XXIII Section 4 is not paid.

I

It

j

I
i is not a "continuing grievance" because the Company acted once.

i!i

"

It placed the grievant on the night shift as a permanent lead

;j

!

'

:
:

j man and did not pay him ten percent above his regular night shift
;

i

•

rate.

Thereafter it made no further decisions and took no further1

action in that regard.

In my view a "continuing grievance" re-

quires a reiteration and renewal of the original decision or the
implementation of a new decision having the same or similar adverse
effect.

A continuation of an event rooted in a single managerial

;l determination (here the Company's decision not to pay the additional ten percent because there was already "an employee" on
the night shift receiving the additional ten percent, thereby,
in the Company's opinion, satisfying the requirements of Article
XXIII Section 4), is not a continuing grievance.

Rather it is a

perpetuation of and synonymous with the original "occurrence."
The instant situation is no more a "continuing

grievance"

than a discharge, where an employer takes a single action terminating an employee, and that employee remains off the payroll

-4through a series of pay periods until his grievance is heard.
Clearly, a time limit on filing that grievance is binding from
the date of discharge and may not be filed after a contractual
time limit has expired merely because the affected employee is
"continuously" off the payroll.

Similarly here, the contractual

time limits relate to and run from the Company's single action
in not paying the grievant the additional ten percent when he
was placed on the night .shift as a permanent lead man, and not
from any time or period thereafter.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
I having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
•!

| parties makes the following AWARD:
The grievance of Kenneth Pausz is not
arbitrable.

Eric' j. Schmertz
Aifbitrator
DATED: March 8, 1983
STATE OF New York ) ss> .
COUNTY OF New York ) "

1

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 153, OPEIU
OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
International Ladies' Garment
Workers Union

The stipulated issue is:
What shall be the disposition of the
grievance of Edline St. Hill?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on September 12, 1983 at which time Ms. St.Hill,
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of
Local 153 and the ILGWU, hereinafter referred to respectively
as the "Union" and the "Employer" appeared.

All concerned were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

waived.
The grievance protests the grievant's discharge.
Following my Award of November 29, 1982, the parties reached
a separate oral agreement for the reinstatement of eight employee
laid off from the Computer Center.
All but one term of that agreement are undisputed.

The

eight employees, including the grievant, were to be placed in
jobs unilaterally

selected by the Employer.

Within a four week

period they were to come forward if they thought they were unsuited to the job into which they were placed, in which event
they'd be reassigned elsewhere.

They were given the same four

week period to perform the job assigned satisfactorily.
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The parties disagree on what was to happen if an employee's
work was unsatisfactory

at the end of the four weeks.

The

Employer claims that the agreement included the express condition that in that event, the employee could be terminated as if
he was a new employee.

The Union contends that unsatisfactory

performance by the employee for and at the end of the four week
period would permit the employee to exercise his or her bumping
rights under my prior Award.
Based on the testimony and logic I accept the Employer's
version of the disputed part of the verbal agreement.
The Employer's witness who testified on the disputed aspect
of the agreement was the one who negotiated the arrangement with
the Union.

The Union's witness was not its primary represent-

ative in those negotiations, but rather one who was present at
the discussions and was not present when the Union explained the
agreement to the affected employees before the plan was implemented.

The Union's principal negotiator and the one who ex-

plained the plan to the employees was not present at the arbitration hearing and did not testify.
More determinative in my view is that the Employer's version
is the more logical quid pro quo for the reinstatement of the
employees involved.

To obtain reinstatement under my prior Aware

the Union would have had to prove an employee's qualifications
for the job sought, and the Employer was prepared to challenge
and contest in arbitration the qualifications of each employee
seeking to bump.
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The agreement reached obviated any such contestation or the
possibility of not achieving reemployment.

So an agreement to

give the employee four weeks to show ability or be terminated
is a logical and causal condition in exchange for guaranteed
reinstatement.
Also, the agreement which placed the eight employees, including the grievant, back on the Employer's payroll foreclosed
the disruption and dislocations which would have occurred if any
of the employees established qualifications to bump, and the
bumping process, with its attendant "domino" effect on the cleric
staff went forward.

I think it most unlikely and illogical for

the Employer to agree to this latter process, with the very
effect it sought to avoid, if a resinstated employee was unable
to perform the assigned job satisfactorily within the prescribed
four weeks.
The record clearly shows that the grievant was given a noncomplex job, the easiest available in the particular office, as
a receptionist and centrex telephone operator.

I am persuaded

that she continued to make serious mistakes throughout the four
week period, primarily in the use of the centrex system and that
at the end of the four week period her work was still unsatisfactory.
That the job assignment may not have been suited to her is
at this point immaterial.

Her assignment to it was not contested

and she did not claim its unsuitability within the four weeks.

-4That the grlevant may have been improving is not something
the Arbitrator may consider.

The parties, not the Arbitrator

fixed the trial period at four weeks and it is to that time limit
that the Arbitrator and the parties are bound.

Indeed, in the

grievant's case she was not terminated until five weeks had
elapsed.
Under the foregoing circumstances I must uphold the Employer'
decision and sustain the grievant's discharge.
Any consideration of a further opportunity for the grievant
in some other job because of her years of employment and because
she was laid off from her job as a key punch operator in the
Computer Center without any fault, or her part, is a matter for
the discretionary consideration of the Employer.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The grievance of Edline St. Hill is denied.

DATED: October 11, 1983
STATE OF New York )ss.:
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 144, S.E.I.U.

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #13 30 0185 83

and
Interstate United c/o Hebrew Home
for the Aged

The stipulated issue is:
What shall be the disposition of the
grievance of Kumar Chandoo?
A hearing was held on July 7, 1983 at which time Mr.
Chandoo, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and
representatives of the above named Union and Employer appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Union claims that when promoted from Second Cook to
First Cook in 19.81, , the grievant did not receive the correct
compensation.

The facts are that at the time of the promotion

the grievant was already earning above the beginning rate of
First Cook, and carried that rate of pay into the promotion
without any additional pay increase'.

Thereafter the grievant

received only the regular general contract increases.
The Union contends that upon the promotion and consistent
with past practice obtaining to other employees, the grievant
should have carried with him the "differential" he enjoyed while
a second cook, between his pay then•and the job rate.

The Union

calculates that upon the promotion, to perpetuate the differential
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the grievant should have received approximately $12 a week more0
And that subsequent general contract increases should have been
built on that additional base pay. ' It is the Union's position
that the failure to grant the grievant the "differential" at
the time of his promotion has left his present pay level (after
general contract percent increases) about $20 a week below what
it should be.
The Employer asserts that there is no contractual support
for the Union's claim or for the grievance.

It points out that

the contract is silent on the rate of pay applicable to a promotion and that so long as the promoted employee is paid at least
the starting rate of the new job, there is no contract violation.
In the instant case the Employer ar.gues that the grievant was
paid above the starting rate (because he was already being paid
more in his predecessor job) and that for him to carry that rate
of pay into the promotion without an increase is contractually
proper and consistent with past practice in similar situations.
I am persuaded that an equitable decision is warranted in
this case.

The Employer is correct when he points out that the

contract is silent on this type of situation, and does not
specifically provide a rate of pay or pay formula upon a job
promotion.

Yet fundamentally, the matter of wages is a bargain-

able issue and should not be unilaterally determined by the
Employer unless the contract accords that specific and reserved
authority.

This contract which does not deal with rates of pay
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upon promotion also does not reserve any right of unilateral
determination to the Employer.
Under that circumstance what'is determinative in my view,
is how the question has been handled in the past either jointly
or by Employer action, accepted or acquiesced in by the Union.
In short, on a bargainable issue such as wages the past practices
serve as evidence of the parties mutual agreement.
On the issue of past practice, the direct employer,
Interstate United, asserts that the past practice of the Hebrew
Home was not to grant further pay increases upon a promotion
where, as here, the employee's pay was already at or above the
starting rate of the higher rated job.
I reject this argument because what is probative to my
mind is not the practices of the Home, but rather the practices
of Interstate United for whom, under this contract, the grievant
is employed.

Interstate United concedes that as the Home's

concessionaire and manager of its food services, it is bound to
the terms of the instant collective bargaining agreement.

In

short, Interstate United is the Home's agent with regard to the
grievant's employment and his conditions of employment.

Thus

it is not what the Home has done in connection with its other
direct employees but rather what Interstate United has done with
other food service employees under its jurisdiction, that is
material.
The evidence shows that the Interstate United manager has
granted and maintained the pay "differential" to and for other

-4food service employees upon their promotions in circumstances
similar to those of the grievant.

The evidence shows that in

some other similar cases, the manager did not grant or maintain
the "differential."

In other words, the practice of Interstate

United, to which the Home is bound on an agency theory, has been
mixed.
It is a well settled rule that employees similarly situated
should be similarly dealt with, and none should enjoy less benefits
than the others.

The only employee before me in this arbitration

is the grievant.

The record discloses that some other employees

who were promoted under circumstances materially the same as
his received or carried the differential. That he did not, is
discriminatorily violative of the foregoing rule.

What is

determinative is not that some employees not before me, did not
get the "differential" but rather that some employees did.

And

the benefit they received should also be accorded to the grievant,
the only employee before me who is .disadvantaged by comparison.
Accordingly, the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having been duly sworn and having duly heard
the proofs and allegations of the above named parties, makes
the following AWARD:
The grievance of Kumar Chandoo is granted,,
His pay shall be adjusted upward and retroactively based on and as if he had received
the $12 a week differential when promoted
from Second Cook to First Cook in 1981.

DATED: July 25, 1983

Eric J. Schmertz

STATE OF New York )gs .
COUNTY OF New York ) "'

Arbitrator
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I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
UAW, Local 379

and

OPINION AND AWARD
Grievance 3182

The Jacobs Manufacturing Company

The stipulated issue is:
What shall be the disposition of Union
grievance 3182 dated October 11, 1982?
A hearing was held in Hartford, Connecticut on April 7,
1983 at which time representatives of the above named Union
and Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to
offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The Union and

the Company filed post-hearing briefs.
Grievance 3182 reads:
The Union maintains there is enough work
in Chipman's classification to warrant
Chipman. Employee should be recalled and
made whole.
The Company's business fell off substantially.

It laid

off the two employees classified as Chipmen and assigned the
remaining work normally performed by a Chipman to one or more
other classifications.
It is the Union's position that employees of other classifications are performing Chipman duties on a full-time basis;
that enought Chipman work exists to support one or more Chipmen
full time; and that it is a violation of the contract for the
two classified Chipmen to remain on layoff.

The Company asserts that at most there is about one-half

-2of a full job of available Chipman work; that the contract does
not require the active maintenance of the Chipman classification
for only one-half a job; that there is no contract prohibition
to the assignment of what Chipman work there is to other classifications; and that one of the classifications. Machine Cleaner,
to which the Union complains the disputed work has been assigned,
has always removed and cleaned away chips as part of its regular
duties.
As I see it the issue is a narrow one.

It is whether there

is sufficient work removing and cleaning away chips to support
a Chipman full time.

If so, consistent with a line of decisions

rendered by this Arbitrator in prior cases involving similar
circumstances and contract language, a Chipman vacancy would
exist within the meaning of Article XV of the contract and the
work should be assigned to an employee in that classification.
Under that circumstance, for it to be performed full-time
by employees differently classified whose regular duties do not
include the chip work, would be a circumvention of the job
classification structure of the contract and an evasion of the
contractual duty to fill a job to which those duties have been
regularly and historically assigned.
The evidence persuades me that the Chipman did not remove
and/or clear away chips exclusively.

The Machine Cleaner

(referred to also as Cleaner-Washer) "pulls" or cleans away chips
as a regular part of his machine cleaning duties.

The delineation

which the Union alleges between the type of chip "pulling"
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performed by the Chipman and that performed by the Machine
Cleaner appears to me to be a "distinction without a difference."
Hence I cannot include within the quantity of available "chip
work," the work performed by the Machine Cleaners.
The question therefore further narrows to whether the
remaining chip work would support one or more Chipmen full time.
The parties are in sharp disagreement on this issue.

The most

probative evidence, in my view, are the statistics introduced
into evidence by the Company showing the dramatic decrease in the
quantity of chips attendant to the substantial fall-off of
business, and the job tickets showing the hours worked by employee
of other classifications, including the Machine Cleaner, on chips.
The former show, undisputedly, that the quantity of metal chips
is about one-third of what it was when the two Chipmen
employed.

were

The latter show that the hours spent by other employees

on this work add up to from 3% to 4% hours a day, or about onehalf a full time job.
Accordingly, the Company's contention that there is not
a sufficient quantity of chip work to support a Chipman full time
is affirmed.

Under that circumstance

I find no contract violation

by the two Chipmen remaining on layoff and find no contract prohibition to the assignment of the available chip work to other
classifications.

Indeed, the record shows that past practice

supports that latter procedure.
This is not to say that employees to whom the work has been
assigned are now properly paid, or properly graded.

Those

-4questions are not before me, and therefore the rights of the
parties in that connection are expressly reserved.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
Union grievance 3182 dated October 11, 1982,
is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: August 1, 1983
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York ) "
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
UAW, Local 379

and

OPINION AND AWARD
Grievance 3182

The Jacobs Manufacturing Company

The stipulated issue is:
What shall be the disposition of Union
grievance 3182 dated October 11, 1982?
A hearing was held in Hartford, Connecticut on April 7,
1983 at which time representatives of the above named Union
and Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to
offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The Union and

the Company filed post-hearing briefs.
Grievance 3182 reads:
The Union maintains there is enough work
in Chipman's classification to warrant
Chipman. Employee should be recalled and
made whole.
The Company's business fell off substantially.

It laid

off the two employees classified as Chipmen and assigned the
remaining work normally performed by a Chipman to one or more
other classifications.
It is the Union's position that employees of other classifications are performing Chipman duties on a full-time basis;
that enought Chipman work exists to support one or more Chipmen
full time; and that it is a violation of the contract for the
two classified Chipmen to remain on layoff.

The Company asserts that at most there is about one-half
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of a full job of available Chipman work; that the contract does
not require the active maintenance of the Chipman classification
for only one-half a job; that there is no contract prohibition
to the assignment of what Chipman work there is to other classifications; and that one of the classifications, Machine Cleaner,
to which the Union complains the disputed work has been assigned,
has always removed and cleaned away chips as part of its regular
duties.
As I see it the issue is a narrow one.

It is whether there

is sufficient work removing and cleaning away chips to support
a Chipman full time.

If so, consistent with a line of decisions

rendered by this Arbitrator in prior cases involving similar
circumstances and contract language, a Chipman vacancy would
exist within the meaning of Article XV of the contract and the
work should be assigned to an employee in that classification.
Under that circumstance, for it to be performed full-time
by employees differently classified whose regular duties do not
include the chip work, would be a circumvention of the job
classification structure of the contract and an evasion of the
contractual duty to fill a job to which those duties have been
regularly and historically assigned.
The evidence persuades me that the Chipman did not remove
and/or clear away chips exclusively.

The Machine Cleaner

(referred to also as Cleaner-Washer) "pulls" or cleans away chips
as a regular part of his machine cleaning duties.

The delineation

which the Union alleges between the type of chip "pulling"
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performed by the Chipman and that performed by the Machine
Cleaner appears to me to be a "distinction without a difference."
Hence I cannot include within the quantity of available "chip
work," the work performed by the Machine Cleaners.
The question therefore further narrows to whether the
remaining chip work would support one or more Chipmen full time.
The parties are in sharp disagreement on this issue.

The most

probative evidence, in my view, are the statistics introduced
into evidence by the Company showing the dramatic decrease in the
quantity of chips attendant to the substantial fall-off of
business, and the job tickets showing the hours worked by employee
of other classifications, including the Machine Cleaner, on chips.
The former show, undisputedly, that the quantity of metal chips
is about one-third of what it was when the two Chipmen
employed.

were

The latter show that the hours spent by other employees

on this work add up to from 3% to 4% hours a day, or about onehalf a full time job.
Accordingly, the Company's contention that there is not
a sufficient quantity of chip work to support a Chipman full time
is affirmed.

Under that circumstance

I find no contract violatioh

by the two Chipmen remaining on layoff and find no contract prohibition to the assignment of the available chip work to other
classifications.

Indeed, the record shows that past practice

supports that latter procedure.
This is not to say that employees to whom the work has been
assigned are now properly paid, or properly graded.

Those

-4questions are not before me, and therefore the rights of the
parties in that connection are expressly reserved.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
Union grievance 3182 dated October 11, 1982,
is denied.

.Eric /* Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: August 1, 1983
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York ) *
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
District 15, IAMAW
OPINION AND AWARD
Case #82K/23787

and
Lockheed Electronics Company, Inc

The stipulated issue is:
"Under the cost of living clause contained
in Article VIII, Pay Provisions, Section
4 currently in effect between the parties,
shall the Company carry forward any COL
adjustment not paid due to the cap to be
paid in the next adjustment period, should
the cap not be attained in that subsequent
adjustment period?"
Article VIII Section 4 (Cost of Living Adjustment) reads
Paragraph b
"During the period of this Agreement, COL
adjustments shall be made at the following times:
Effective Date of
Adjustment
November 2, 1981
May 3, 1982
November 1, 1982
May 2, 1983
November 7, 1983

Based upon the Price
Index for :
September, 1981
March, 1982
September, 1982
March, 1983
September, 1983

Paragraph c
"Effective the payroll period commencing on
November 2, 1981, the Cost of Living Adjustment shall be in accordance with the following table:
Price
165.2
265.3
26506
265.9

Index
and below
- 265.5
- 265.8
- 266.1
etc.
269.5 - 269.7

COL Adjustment
-0$.01 per hour
.02 per hour
.03 per hour
etc.
.15 per hour

-2And so forth, with $.01 adjustment for each
0.3 point change in the Price Index for the
appropriate date set forth in paragraph (b).
However, no COL adjustment shall exceed $.30."
The Union's position is that when in a subsequent period
this cap is not reached it may recover in that subsequent period
that portion of the increased cost of living not paid in the
prior period because of the $.30/hr. cap.
The Company's position is that mathematical cost of living
increases in excess of the contractual cap are "lost"; that
subsequent adjustment periods stand on their own and are based
solely on the CPI increases from the prior to the subsequent
period.
The evidence indicates that the particular question posed
in this case was not explicitly discussed or mutually considered
during contract bargaining.
In my opinion, the contract provisions and the 1978 Memorandum of Understanding are not clearly dispositive of the issue.
The fact is that arguably either interpretation could be supported under the contract language, although I am constrained to
conclude that the Union's version would do violence to the final
provision of Article VIII Section 4, paragraph c, which reads:
However no COL adjustment shall exceed $.30.
(emphasis added)
To permit an adjustment barred in one period by the cap, to
be carried over and added to the adjustment of a subsequent
period, would produce an adjustment, albeit delayed, in the prior
period's cost of living increase in excess of the $.30 per hour,
and would constructively nullify the cap.
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However, I recognize that the argument can be made, as
advanced herein by the Union, that if the cost of living adjustment of a subsequent period does not reach the cap, there is no
explicit contract prohibition to including subsequently what had
been previously "lost."
The fact is that the contract language is ambiguous.

In

that circumstance, resort is to past practice for clarification
and intent.

The evidence of past practice since the introduction

of the "cap" supports the Company's interpretation.

From the

beginning of the 1972 contract period the cost of living increase
for each adjustment period has been calculated on the CPI increase
from the end of the prior adjustment, and in no case has a wage
increase foreclosed during the prior period by the "cap" been
included in any subsequent adjustment.
I find that practice to be controlling.

Therefore the

interpretation which the Union seeks is a matter for collective
bargaining, not arbitration.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
Under the cost of living clause contained in
Article VIII Pay Provisions, Section 4 currently
contained in effect between the parties, the
Company shall not carry forward any COL adjustment not paid due to the cap to be paid in the
next adjustment period, should the cap not be
obtained in that subsequent adjustment period.

DATED: May 31, 1983
STATE OF New York )sg .
COUNTY OF New York )

E/ic J. Schmertz f
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
District 15, IAMAW
OPINION AND AWARD
Case #82K/23787

and

Lockheed Electronics Company, Inc,

The stipulated issue is:
"Under the cost of living clause contained
in Article VIII, Pay Provisions, Section
4 currently in effect between the parties,
shall the Company carry forward any COL
adjustment not paid due to the cap to be
paid in the next adjustment period, should
the cap not be attained in that subsequent
adjustment period?"
Article VIII Section 4 (Cost of Living Adjustment) reads
Paragraph b
"During the period of this Agreement, COL
adjustments shall be made at the following times:
Effective Date of
Adjustment
November 2, 1981
May 3, 1982
November 1, 1982
May 2, 1983
November 7, 1983

Based upon the Price
Index forj
September, 1981
March, 1982
September, 1982
March, 1983
September, 1983

Paragraph c
"Effective the payroll period commencing on
November 2, 1981, the Cost of Living Adjustment shall be in accordance with the following table:
Price
165.2
265.3
265.6
265.9

Index
and below
- 265.5
- 265.8
- 266.1
etc.
269.5 - 269.7

COL Adjustment
-0$.01 per hour
.02 per hour
.03 per hour
etc.
o15 per hour

-2And so forth, with $.01 adjustment for each
0.3 point change in the Price Index for the
appropriate date set forth in paragraph (b).
However, no COL adjustment shall exceed $.30."
The Union's position is that when in a subsequent period
this cap is not reached it may recover in that subsequent period
that portion of the increased cost of living not paid in the
prior period because of the $.30/hr,, cap.
The Company's position is that mathematical cost of living
increases in excess of the contractual cap are "lost"; that
subsequent adjustment periods stand on their own and are based
solely on the CPI increases from the prior to the subsequent
period.
The evidence indicates that the particular question posed
in this case was not explicitly discussed or mutually considered
during contract bargaining.
In my opinion, the contract provisions and the 1978 Memorandum of Understanding are not clearly dispositive of the issue.
The fact is that arguably either interpretation could be supported under the contract language, although I am constrained to
conclude that the Union's version would do violence to the final j
provision of Article VIII Section 4, paragraph c, which reads:
However no COL adjustment shall exceed
(emphasis added)

$.30.

To permit an adjustment barred in one period by the cap, to
be carried over and added to the adjustment of a subsequent
period, would produce an adjustment, albeit delayed, in the prior j
period's cost of living increase in excess of the $.30 per hour, j
and would constructively nullify the cap.
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However, I recognize that the argument can be made, as
advanced herein by the Union, that if the cost of living adjustment of a subsequent period does not reach the cap, there is no
explicit contract prohibition to including subsequently what had
been previously "lost."
The fact is that the contract language is ambiguous.

In

that circumstance, resort is to past practice for clarification
and intent.

The evidence of past practice since the introduction

of the "cap" supports the Company's interpretation.

From the

beginning of the 1972 contract period the cost of living increase
for each adjustment period has been calculated on the CPI increase
from the end of the prior adjustment, and in no case has a wage
increase foreclosed during the prior period by the "cap" been
included in any subsequent adjustment.
I find that practice to be controlling.

Therefore the

interpretation which the Union seeks is a matter for collective
bargaining, not arbitration.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
Under the cost of living clause contained in
Article VIII Pay Provisions, Section 4 currently
contained in effect between the parties, the
Company shall not carry forward any COL adjustment not paid due to the cap to be paid in the
next adjustment period, should the cap not be
obtained in that subsequent adjustment period.

DATED: May 31, 1983
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
LIU Faculty Federation Local 3998
NYSUT, AFT

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #13 39 0415 83

Long Island University

The stipulated issue is:
Was the non-reappointment of Professor Paul
Gengo a violation of the collective bargaining agreement? If so, what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held on July 12, 1983 at which time
Professor Gengo, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant"
and representatives of the above named Union and University
appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to

offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.
Though the grievant, a probationary Assistant Professor
of Taxation and Law in the University's School of Business and
Public Administration was unanimously recommended for contract
renenwal by the School's Departmental Personnel Committee and
by the Departmental Chairman, that recommendation was rejected
by the Dean.

The Dean's action was affirmed by the University

President.
The Union claims that denial of

reappointment, was in

violation of the contract on several grounds.

It asserts that

when the Departmental Personnel Committee and Chairman are in
agreement on a reappointment recommendation, the Dean has no
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contractual authority to veto or reverse that recommendation.
Alternatively, the Union claims that under that circumstance
even if the contract is silent, the unvaried practice has
been for the Deans to accept such recommendation; that this
is the first case where that practice was not followed; and
that the past practice provision
the instant case.

of the contract controls

Also, the Union contends that the Dean

did not communicate with the Personnel Committee and/or the
Departmental Chairman before reversing their recommendation,
and that in any event the denial of reappointment was for
"economic" not "academic" reasons and the University did not
follow the prescribed procedure of the contract when faculty
reductions are effectuated for economic purposes.

Finally,

the Union points out that the grievant had seniority over
other probationary faculty members of the School whose contracts also expired at the same time, and that one of the
latter, rather than the grievant should have been terminated
if the teaching faculty was to be reduced.
I do not find contractual or past practice support for
the Union's contentions.
Article VIII of the contract and especially Section 4
thereof clearly establishes that the decision on reappointment
or

non-reappointment is not made by the Departmental Personnel

Committee and/or the Department Chairman even if they are in
unanimous agreement.

The pertinent language of Section 4 reads

_ o_

Reasons for Non-renewal
A decision by the Administration not to
renew the appointment of a probationary
employee may be made for academic reasons
or economic reasons. (Emphasis added)
The Personnel Committee and Chairman are not the
"Administration."

The Administration

is represented by the

Dean and the President, as well of course, by the Trustees.
Hence the Union is in error when it claims that the Dean and
the President may not reverse the recommendation of the
Committee and Chairman.

Clearly, though their views should

be given careful consideration and significant weight, the
Committee and Chairman make only a recommendation to the Dean
and President, and not the final decision.

The contractual

right of the Administration to accept or reject that recommendation is preserved.
Nor is there sufficient probative evidence of an unvaried
past practice suggestive of the Union's case.

The allegation

of a practice is just that - allegation. Neither side was able
to document a practice one way or the other, and hence the
claim of a practice, to be enforced by a past practice clause,
fails.
The contract does not require the Dean to confer with
the Personnel Committee or Chairman before making the decision.
Nonetheless, the facts in this case indicate that there was
communication between the Administration

and at least the

Departmental Chairman before the final non-renewal decision
was made.

-4I accept the University's claim and reason that this
non-renewal was for "academic" reasons.

The University's

witnesses testified that the School of Business decided to
change the mix of its faculty by reducing the number of
professors teaching accounting and taxation and by increasing those with specialties in computer science and public
administration.
former.

The grievant's qualifications were the

The University offered evidence showing that companion

with its decision regarding the grievant, it hired additional
faculty for computer science and at least one more for public
administration.

The accounting courses taught by the grievant

were assigned to adjuncts.
A change in faculty "mix" to meet different subject
matter or pedagogical demands is, in my view, an "academic"
reason,

within the meaning of the contract.

An "academic"

reason is not limited to whether or not a faculty member meets
the requisite academic teaching standards, or possesses the
required academic credentials.

It includes also the policy

decision of what academic courses are to be taught and/or
emphasized.
I will not substitute my judgment for that of the Universit
in regard to that latter policy.

Suffice it to say that there

is enought evidence supportive of that academic decision to
rebut any claim of arbitrariness or capriciousness.

Also,

Article VI Section 5 of the contract (Academic Judgment) bars
the arbitrator from "reviewing the merits of the academic
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judgment or substituting his judgment therefore."
Finally, though the record does not disclose why less
senior probationary professors of accounting or law were
renewed when the grievant who possessed professional credentials in both accounting and law was not, and while sensible
personnel practices might have pointed to a different result,
I find nothing in the contract which requires the University
to make non-reappointment decisions regarding probationary
employees, on the basis of seniority.
Again, in this case, there is no evidence that the
decision to keep others and not to reappoint the grievant,
was discriminatory, arbitrary or capricious.

Absent any such

showing, the arbitrator cannot legislate into the contract a
seniority basis for the non-renewal of probationary employees.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator,
and having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of the above named parties makes the following
AWARD:
The non-reappointment of Professor Paul
Gengo was not a violation of the collective bargaining agreement„

DATED: July 25, 1983
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
.

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
LIU Faculty Federation, Local 3998
NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #13 39 0912 83

and
Long Island University

The stipulated issue is:
Did the University breach Article II and
XIII of the collective bargaining agreement when it imposed a particular work
load on Professor Roberta Kopping?
A hearing was held on October 25, 1983 at which time
Professor Kopping hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and
representatives of the above named Union and University appeared
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The pertinent part of Article XIII is Section 2(d) which
reads:
(d) Normal Workload: The required teaching
load for a full-time faculty member is 12
semester hours, except in those instructional
skill-type classes where the contact hour has
been accepted as the unit of workload, in each
of the two regular fall/spring semesters of
the academic year. Any reclassification of
courses or classification of new courses in
terms of unit workload will require the approval
of the faculty and Employer.
The pertinent parts of Article II are Sections 3(a) and
(b) which read:
(a) The parties shall identify in writing the

-2specific past practices in effect prior to
this Agreement and not covered by that Agreement, which are desired to be continued by
this Agreement.
(b) The parties shall submit their written
lists of the above mentioned items not later
than November 30, 1979.
The grievant is Director of Clinical Education and Assistant
Professor of Respiratory Therapy.

She was hired for the 1980-

81 academic year and was assigned a work load of 24 hours per
semester.

This work load continued until the 1983-84 academic

year when it was reduced to 12 hours per semester.
The grievant and the Union on her behalf claim that the
24 hour per semester work load was twice what is provided for in
Article XIII Section 2(d) of the contract; that though the grievant complained about it, it was not reduced for the time covered
by this grievance; that the grievant did not receive "overload"
pay for the extra 12 hours a semester; that any "past practice"
regarding this

particular position was terminated by the

University's failure to preserve it under the provisions of
Article II of the contract; and that the grievant is entitled
to "overload" pay at the contractual overload rate for 12 hours
each semester that she worked 24 hours.
The University asserts that the grievance is time barred
from arbitration because the grievant did not grieve within 60
calendar days of the occurence of the alleged grievance or within
60 days from the time she had reasonable cause to know of the
grievable occurence, as required by Article XXVII Section 3 of

-3the contract.

The University points out that the grievant was

assigned the 24 hour work load in 1980 and did not formally
grieve until two years later.
On the merits, the University contends that the type of
clinical work performed by the grievant was different from and
not like a "teaching load" of other faculty covered by the contract, and as a matter of past practice, her work, which relates
substantially to teaching and supervising the respiratory training of students in various participating hospitals, had been performed on a 24 hour per semester basis by her predecessor in the
job without additional compensation.
There is no question but that the grievant is a full-time
teaching member of the bargaining unit covered by the instant
collective bargaining agreement.

Article XIII Section 2 makes

no distinction between exclusive classroom teaching and/or
clinical teaching by the "fulltime teaching members of the
bargaining unit."

Section (d) provides for a "normal" teaching

workload of 12 semester hours.
Addendum of November 8, 1980

Juxtaposed with the contractual

means that a teaching load in excess

of the normal 12 hours is to be paid for

as overload.

There is no evidence in this case that the grievant's work
assignment fell within the exception of Article XIII Section 2(d)
as "instructional skill-type classes where the contact hour has
been accepted as the unit of workload in each of the two regular
fall/spring

semesters of the academic year."

-4The main thrust of the University's case on the merits is
that the practice with regard to the grievant's position had been
to assign a 24 hour per semester work schedule at 12 hours of
compensation, and the grievant was informed thereof when she was
hired.
I need not decide whether the University's reliance on
past practice is barred by its failure to "identify in writing
the specific past practice in effect...which are desired to be
continued by the Agreement," as required by Article II Section
3(a).

It is well settled that any past practice is preempted by

clear and explicit contract language to the contrary.

Finding

no exception for the grievant's professional title or work assignment within Article XIII Section 2(d) of the contract, the clear
and explicit contract language thereof mandates a 12 hour work
load per semester for her, and not a 24 hour semester workload.
The University may be right that the grievant's grievance
was not timely filed.

It is obvious that she knew of her work-

load and even complained about it much earlier than 60 days before
she filed an official grievance.

However that is immaterial here

not just because the record shows that she may have been reasonably led to believe by University officials that the problem
would be adjusted without the need for an official grievance, but
also because the contract gives both an employee and the Union
the right to grieve within the prescribed 60 days.

Here I am

persuaded that the Union had no notice of the grievant's workload
and had no basis of knowing of a possible contract violation

-5until the grievant formally complained to the Union and sought
its assitance.

From that point the Union grieved within 60 days;

thereby complying with the requirement that the "grievance...be
filed within sixty (60) days from the time...the Union had reason
able cause to know of such grievable occurrence."

It should be

noted that Section 3 gives the employee or the Union a grievable
cause of action in the alternative.

It does not require the

employee and the Union to grieve within 60 days.
gives the "employee or the Union" that right.

Rather, it

So, if the griev-

ant, as an individual, is time barred from grieving, the Union
is not, and the Union may, as it has here, maintain an action on
the grievant's behalf and for her benefit.
Accordingly, the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having been duly sworn, and having duly heard
the proofs and allegations of the above named parties makes the
following AWARD:
The Union's grievance on behalf of Professor
Roberta Kepping is arbitrable.
The University breached Article XIII of the
collective bargaining agreement when it imposed a particular workoad on Professor
Kopping.
The University shall pay to the Union for
and on behalf of Professor Kopping, overload
pay for 12 hours of work per semester for
each semester she was assigned and worked
24 hours.

DATED: November 21, 1983
STATE OF New
)_
B .
New York ),
oo » .
COUNTY OF New York )'

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
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I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local Union 2100 International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #52 30 0383 82

and
Louisville Gas & Electric Company

The stipulated issue is:
What shall be the disposition of the Union's
grievance No. MCP 81-87 dated November 16
and November 17, 1981?
A hearing was held in Louisville, Kentucky on May 19, 1983
at which time representatives of the above named Union and
Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

A stenographic record was

taken and the Union and Company filed post-hearing briefs.
In pertinent part grievance MCP 81-87 reads:
Past practices and established procedures and
applicable articles of contract are being violated in the areas of shift relief and punching in/out. Employees are being sent out earlier and/or getting back later than the established and normal procedures and are not being
compensated.
Demand that harrassment be stopped and employees be allowed to go back to normal, past and
established procedures in areas of shift relief
and punching in/out. Compensation in form of
overtime pay when applicable.
The Union's grievance relates to the punching in and out
procedures required by the Company of employees working at the
Company's waste processing plant, known as the IUCS.
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It is a Company rule that employees be at their work stations at the starting time of their shift.

The time clock for

the employees assigned to the IUCS is located approximately onehalf a mile from the processing plant.

For employees to be at

the waste processing plant at their fixed starting times, they
must punch in a few minutes earlier; obtain certain tools and
instructions and be transported by Company truck to the work
location.

This procedure is followed in reverse when the employ-

ees punch out at the end of their shift.
The Union complains that the requirement that employees
punch in earlier than their starting time in order to be at work
on time, is improper; that the location of the time clock and
the time punched in should coincide with starting time of the
shift; that the complained-about procedure necessitates the
expenditure of time "at work" for which the employees are not
compensated; and that for the Company to discipline employees
who punch in at the starting time of the shift but who, as a
consequence of the distance from the time clock to the work
location arrive at the work location late, is "harrassment" as
referred to in the grievance, and should be disallowed.
The Union asserts that the foregoing procedure constitutes
a unilateral change in the conditions of employment without Union
agreement and is contrary to past or existing practices.

The

Union asks for an order enjoining this clocking in/out procedure
and seeks overtime compensation for the extra time the employees
spend traveling to and from the time clock and the work area.

-3-

I find nothing in the contract which prohibits the Company
from requiring employees to be at their specific work stations
at the starting time of their shift.

Also, I find nothing in

the contract which prohibits the Company from requiring employees to clock in or out at a location removed from the specific
work areas.

If there be a wage and hour or other statutory

consequence to a procedure which requires employees to travel a
few minutes on their own time from the time clock to arrive at
a work station at the start of a shift, it may be a matter for
other forums, not arbitration.

Additionally of course, a con-

tractual prohibition on this procedure would be a matter for
future collective bargaining.
The real thrust of the Union's grievance is that the procedure required of employees at the IUCS location is different
from what is required of other employees of the Company at other
work locations.

The facts show that from punching in at the main

power house, it takes an additional 4-1/2 to 5 minutes for the
IUCS employees to travel by Company vehicle to the work location.
The past or existing practices upon which the Union rely do not
apply to the IUCS work location because the complained-about
procedure began when that work location became operational.
Rather the practices and procedures to which the Union points,
and which the Union claims the Company unilaterally changed with
regard to the IUCS location, are those at the Company's main
plant.
But the Union's argument in this regard is not supported by
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the record.

The probative evidence shows that employees working

in and about the main plant are also required to punch a time
clock located in the main plant locker room and to then travel
various distances to their work locations.

And they are re-

quired to be at those work locations no later than the start of
the shift.

Therefore employees working in and about the main

plant are bound to the same rules.

They must be at their work

stations at the start of the shift and, like the IUCS employees
must clock in earlier in order to meet that requirement.

What

is determinative in my mind, and what adequately rebuts the
Union's claim that the procedure applied to IUCS employees is
different from what is expected of the other employees, is that
the travel time from the time clock in the locker room of the
main plant to the work locations of employees assigned in and
around the main plant is approximately 3 to 3-1/2 minutes on the
average.

Hence the only difference between the employees in

the main plant and those assigned to the IUCS is that the former
travel from 3 to 3-1/2 minutes on their own time and the latter
from 4-1/2 to 5 minutes.

In my view this difference is de minimus

and does not rise to the level of a change in procedures and
practices.

Nor therefore is it a meaningful differentiation

between one group of employees and another, and not significantly
disparate to be a unilateral change in an existing working
condition.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
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having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties makes the following AWARD:
The Union's grievance No. MCP 81-87 dated
November 16 and November 17, 1981 is
denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: August 25, 1983
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA - and - NEW YORK BUS SERVICE

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 100, Transport Workers Union
of America

OPINION
and
AWARD

and
New York Bus Service

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Ronald Arnold? If not, what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held on August 5, 1983 at which time Mr.
Arnold, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above named Union and Employer appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
As the new Impartial Chairman I have decided to use this
case not only to dispose of the instant grievance but to give
notice to the parties and the employees of how I interpret the
attendance and related disciplinary provisions of the contract
and how, henceforth, I will apply those provisions.

I do so

because I do not know how my predecessor interpreted and applied
those provisions; because I think it a reasonable possibility
that he may have done so differently; and because under that
circumstance all concerned are entitled to this single notice
of what my rulings will be, before those rulings are fully
imposed.

(It is not my intention to follow this procedure with
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regard to other first interpretations of other contract provision
in subsequent cases.)
The parties are in disagreement over the reason for the
grievant's dismissal.

The Union claims that the reason is

limited to the allegation of poor attendance.

The Employer

asserts that the reason is that plus an excessive accident
record and a generally poor performance record.
hereinafter stated, I need deal

For reasons

only with the attendance issue.

The grievant was a relatively short term employee.
hired in March 1980 and discharged in July 1983.

He was

There is no

serious dispute over his record of poor attendance.

He was

previously warned and suspended for excessive absences.

The

warnings and suspensions were not reversed, so the attendance
record on which they were based is no longer contestable by the
grievant or the Union.

The record shows that his poor attend-

ance continued after his suspension.
What is in question is whether some of his absences and
incidents of attendance infractions should have been excused as
beyond his fault or control because of illness and personal
difficulties.
Article 6 of the contract gives the Employer the right to
discipline an employee for "unexcused and excessive absences."
That discipline for this type of offense should follow the
traditional "progressive discipline" formula of warning, suspension and then discharge if the employee's record fails to achieve
a satisfactory level.
The foregoing contract language gives the Employer the

-3right to discipline progressively for unexcused absences and
for excessive absenteeism.

I interpret that right to mean that

not only unexcused absences are subject to discipline but that
excessive absenteeism is also a disciplinary offense whether
excusable or not.
This contract interpretation is consistent with the wellsettled industrial relations rule in such situations.

An em-

ployer need not retain an employee who is unable to maintain
good and regular attendance.

The reasons for chronic attendance

problems, even if uncontrollable by the employee and even if he
is blameless, are immaterial.

Especially, as here, where the

work involves service to the public in the form of scheduled
and franchised public transportation the Employer has the right
to expect and rely on good and regular attendance by its drivers
and need not tolerate persistent poor attendance regardless of
the reasons.
The foregoing conditions and circumstances are present in
the instant case, and, except for the notice I wish to give to
all concerned, would justify the discharge.
grievant

Hence, as to the

there is no need, factually or for precedent, to

determine if there were other reasons for his discharge.

Because

as I have stated, I wish to use this decision for instructional
purposes, and because the grievant and the Union may have relied
on a different, prior approach, I shall give the grievant one
final chance to achieve and maintain a satisfactory attendance
record.

I shall reduce his discharge to a disciplinary suspension,

-4and shall direct his reinstatement without back pay.

He is

expressly warned that if his attendance record continues to be
unsatisfactory, it would constitute just cause for his discharge.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties makes the
following AWARD:
The discharge of Ronald Arnold is reduced
to a disciplinary suspension. He shall
be forthwith reinstated without back pay.
The period of time from his discharge to
his reinstatement shall be deemed a disciplinary suspension for poor attendance. He
is warned that failure to achieve and maintain a satisfactory attendance record will
be grounds for his discharge.

Impartial Chairman
DATED: August 19, 1983
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) " "
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Communications Workers of America
OPINION
and
and
New York Telephone Company
AWARD

The stipulated issue is:
Were the three day suspensions of Thomas
Golden and David Suchard for just cause?
A hearing was held on November 17, 1983 at which time
Messrs Golden and Suchard, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievants" and representatives of the above named Union and
Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The grievants were suspended for violating the Company
rules on coffee breaks.
It is well settled that an employer has the right to
promulgate and enforce work rules, provided those rules are
reasonable, adequately disseminated to the affected work force
and uniformly applied.
Here, the Company's rules regarding coffee breaks meet that
test.
breaks.

The contract contains no provision for or benefit of coffe
The Company granted the benefit to the employees, includ

ing the grievants, nonetheless.

The rule or policy on coffee

breaks was made known to the grievants both verbally and in
written form.
instructions

A fair reading of the rule together with repeated
to the grievants clearly establish that the grievant
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and others in their classifications are entitled to one coffee
break a day; that it is to be taken in the morning and not exceed
15 minutes.

Repeatedly, prior to the infraction by the grievants,

they and the other employees were warned about abusing the coffee
break benefit, and were especially told that afternoon coffee
breaks had been observed, were violations of the rule and would
not be tolerated.

The written rule or policy expressly states

that "violation(s)...means suspension."
There is no doubt that the grievants knew of the rule and
policy and knew or should have known that an afternoon coffee
break during the afternoon hours of their regular shift was beyoung the scope of and contrary to the coffee break policy.
In the instant case the grievants stopped for a cup of
coffee at about 4 PM on December 10, 1982 during their regular
work hours (their shift was from 7:30 AM to 4:30 PM) on their way
back to the garage after completing their specific work assignment.

Previously that day they had taken their allowed morning

coffee break and their one hour lunch period.
the jobs assigned for the day is immaterial.

That they completec
It is not for the

grievants to judge when the coffee break rule or policy should
not be invoked.

The Company has the right to require employees

to work their full shift and may, as here, prohibit a diversion
like an afternoon coffee break, especially when as here there is
no contract benefit of any coffee break.
The written rule provides for a suspension in the case of a
violation.

That penalty was also made known and was in fact known

-3by the grievants before their violations.

There is no evidence

that the Company has not imposed that penalty in similar prior
situations.

Under those circumstances I do not find the penalty

of a three day suspension to be inappropriate or unreasonable.
Accordingly, the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the above named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The three day suspensions of David Suchard
and Thomas Golden were for just cause.

DATED: November 21, 1983
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Mattel: of the Arbitration
between
Communications Workers of America
OPINION
and
and

New York Telephone Company
AWARD

The stipulated issue is:
Were the three day suspensions of Thomas
Golden and David Suchard for just cause?
A hearing was held on November 17, 1983 at which time
Messrs Golden and Suchard, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievants" and representatives of the above named Union and
Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
v

The grievants were suspended for violating the Company
rules on coffee breaks.
It is well settled that an employer has the right to
promulgate and enforce work rules, provided those rules are
reasonable, adequately disseminated to the affected work force
and uniformly applied.
Here, the Company's rules regarding coffee breaks meet that
test.
breaks.

The contract contains no provision for or benefit of coffe
The Company granted the benefit to the employees, includ

ing the grievants, nonetheless.

The rule or policy on coffee

breaks was made known to the grievants both verbally and in
written form.

A fair reading of the rule together with repeated

instructions to the grievants clearly establish that the grievant
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and others in their classifications are entitled to one coffee
break a day; that it is to be taken in the morning and not exceed
15 minutes.

Repeatedly, prior to the infraction by the grievants,

they and the other employees were warned about abusing the coffee
break benefit, and were especially told that afternoon coffee
breaks had been observed, were violations of the rule and would
not be tolerated.

The written rule or policy expressly states

that "violation(s)...means suspension."
There is no doubt that the grievants knew of the rule and
policy and knew or should have known that an afternoon coffee
break during the afternoon hours of their regular shift was beyoung the scope of and contrary to the coffee break policy.
In the instant case the grievants stopped for a cup of
coffee at about 4 PM on December 10, 1982 during their regular
work hours (their shift was from 7:30 AM to 4:30 PM) on their way
back to the garage after completing their specific work assignment.

Previously that day they had taken their allowed morning

coffee break and their one hour lunch period.
the jobs assigned for the day is immaterial.

That they completec
It is not for the

grievants to judge when the coffee break rule or policy should
not be invoked.

The Company has the right to require employees

to work their full shift and may, as here, prohibit a diversion
like an afternoon coffee break, especially when as here there is
no contract benefit of any coffee break.
The written rule provides for a suspension in the case of a
violation.

That penalty was also made known and was in fact known

-3by the grievants before their violations.

There is no evidence

that the Company has not imposed that penalty in similar prior
situations.

Under those circumstances I do not find the penalty

of a three day suspension to be inappropriate or unreasonable.
Accordingly, the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the above named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The three day suspensions of David Suchard
and Thomas Golden were for just cause.

DATED: November 21, 1983
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

v

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Communication Workers of America
RULING
and
New York Telephone Company

The threshold question requiring a ruling is whether
this case is confined to the grievance of J. Manley, or
whether the grievances of R. Barbarelli, D. Burney, R.
Valenzuela and J. Salimbene should be joined with the Manley
grievance and heard in this proceeding by this Arbitrator.
The rule which I think is applicable in this situation
was enumerated years ago by the late David Cole, one of the
most respected arbitrators in the history of the profession.
He ruled that absent an explicit contract provision limiting
an arbitration case to a single grievance or explicitly
barring multiple grievances in the same case, joinder of
grievances is contractually proper and a motion for joinder
should be granted.
I agree with this rule, especially where as here, there
is no such express and limiting contract language and the
grievances appear to be related to the same or similar circumstances.

Additionally the contract permits either side to

submit terminal grievances to the arbitration forum, again
without limiting any arbitration to only one such grievance.
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Accordingly the Company's motion to join the five grievances
in this case is granted.

I assure the Union that in this

case each grievant will be given his "day in court;" that
each will be accorded due process; and that the burden is on
the Company to prove that as to each grievant its discipline
was for just cause.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: December 14, 1983

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
North Canton Education Association

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #53 39 0270 82

and

North Canton City Board of Education

The stipulated issue is:
What shall be the disposition of the
grievance of Rex Spaulding?
A hearing was held in Canton, Ohio on January 5, 1983
at which time Mr. Spaulding, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant" and representatives of the above named Association
and Board appeared.

All concerned were afforded full oppor-

tunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

graphic record was taken.

A steno-

The Association and the Board filed

post-hearing briefs.
The grievant and the Association on his behalf claim
that a report of his classroom performance made by his high
school Principal was an "evaluation" within the meaning of
Article II Sections 2.01 and 2.02 of the collective bargaining
agreement; that it was not in the form prescribed by Section
2.09; and therefore should be "removed from any and all files"
of the Board.
I conclude that the Principal's observation of the
grievant, his conference thereafter with the grievant, his
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written report of that observation and conference together
with the signing of that written report by the grievant and
its retention by the Principal in his files was consistent
with Section 2.04 of the contract, and had not at that point
become an "evaluation" within the meaning of Sections 2.01
and 2.02 of the contract.
However, when the Principal sent a copy of the report
to the Superintendent of Schools, it became, in my view, an
"evaluation" designed for the Superintendent's information
and use.

Because the grievant's personnel file is maintained

in the Superintendent's office, the transmittal of the report
to the Superintendent constituted a construction "placing of
the report in the grievant's personnel file."

Section 2.04

of the contract does not authorize the Principal to forward
observation reports to the Superintendent of Schools.

In my

judgment, by its information to and potential evaluative use
by the Superintendent, the report was transformed into an
"evaluation" within the meaning and intent of Sections 2.01
and 2.02 of the contract.

Had the report been properly in-

tended solely as a factor to be considered in a later full
evaluation of the grievant by the Principal, there would be
no reason for it to be transmitted to the Superintendent.
Under the instant circumstances, the Superintendent's knowledge
and possession of the observation report, especially when
employee personnel files are maintained in the Superintendent's
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office, are prejudicial to the grievant and elevate the
report to the level of an evaluation as intended by Sections
2.01 and 2.02.
Accordingly, because the report, with its evaluative
impact when transmitted to the Superintendent did not take
the exclusive form required by Section 2.09, that part of
the process by the Board violated the contract.
The Board is directed to remove and expunge said report
from the Superintendent's office and files.
I am not persuaded by the Board's argument that the
report constituted a "complaint" within the meaning of Section
2.05 of the contract.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
parties makes the following AWARD:
The grievance of Rex Spaulding is
granted to the extent that the classroom observation report of Principal
Theodore Isue shall be removed from
the office of the Superintendent of
Schools and from any of the files in
the office of the Superintendent of
Schools.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: May 21, 1983
STATE OF New York )
ss
COUNTY OF New York ) *'
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath
as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and
who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

